



5. MY CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CAME ONE DAY AFTER THE ARRESTIVE ARMY MUTINY OF AUGUST 5. THE NERVOUSNESS OF THE REGIME WAS EVIDENT IN SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY. AT THE FRONT DOOR, TWO ARMY MACHINE GUNS ON TRIPLES POINTED OUT THROUGH THE GLASS WINDOWS WITH UNIFORMED SOLDIERS STANDING NEARBY. IN THE ANTECHAMBER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, I SHARED THE SPACE WITH A SOLDIER WHO SAT AT AN IMMEDIATE DESK WITH AN ARMY RIFLE ON THE TABLE TOP AND POINTED AT ME. WHEN I WAS LOCATED INTO THE MINISTER'S OFFICE, THE SOLDIER PICKED UP HIS WEAPON AND WALKED BEHIND ME TO THE DOOR, WHICH IS HOW I TODAY.

6. DR. SHAM WALI SEEMED PLEASED TO RECEIVE SECRETARY VANCE'S MSG. HE READ IT CAREFULLY AND TELLER THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SENT IT. I THINK IT WAS A TIMELY MESSAGE. ALTHOUGH I AM NOT SURE THAT SHAM WALI CAUGHT ANY OF THE NUANCES IN THE PIECE. THE IMPORTANT THING TO HIM WAS PROBABLY THAT THE SECRETARY HAD TROUBLED TO SEND IT.

7. AS I STATED IN THE SUMMARY, SHAM WALI ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS GOVT'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, ASSUMING THE POSTURE OF AN AGGRIEVED AND MISUNDERSTOOD PARTY. HE RELATED THAT HIS GOVT HAD NEVER DONE ANYTHING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, WAS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO BE A THREAT TO THE U.S., AND WAS SURE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COULD NOT OBJECT TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS THE REGIME HAD TAKEN TO ABOLISH "FEUDALISM". I TOLD HIM I WOULD TRANSMIT THIS MSG.

8. WE TALKED FOR ABOUT FIFTEEN MIN. I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE THEN EARLIER, BUT EVERY TIME I STARTED TO RISE, HE WOULD INTERJECT A NEW QUESTION. IT WAS A SENSITIVE SITUATION IN OUR RELATIONS. I THOUGHT IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SEEM INTERESTED AND RESPONSIVE, AND TO TAKE CARE TO AVOID A SUGGESTION OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MAN.

9. SHAM WALI IS SHY AND DIFFIDENT BEFORE ME AT FIRST WITH OUTSIDERS, BUT LIKE THE LAST TIME, LAST APRIL, HE WARMED UP IN TIME. HE SPEAKS SURELY - BUT NOT IN A WHISPER, NEVER LOUD - HE SAYS MUCH, AND HE IS VERY CALM IN HIS ANSWERS. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH WELL. AT THE END OF OUR MEETING, HE HAD OUR PICTURES TAKEN, AND TOLD US WHETHER THERE WILL BE CARRIED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. HE HAD NO NOTE-TAKER PRESENT.

10. AFTER SAYING THE REGIMEN WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., SHAM WALI COMPLAINED LOUDLY ABOUT TWO THINGS: NO BROADCASTS, AND THE CRITICAL AMERICAN PRESS. HE DID NOT DWELL ON EITHER, AND I SAW NO POINT IN ENTERING A REBATE.

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INFO RUMUPT/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 642  
RUMR00/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9134  
RUMDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1720  
RUMNMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1875  
RUMBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7205  
RUMMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 381  
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9. DURING THE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH CAME UP. I OFFERED MENTION OF THE NAME TO BRIEF HIM ON OUR DISCONTENT WITH THE DRA'S COOPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE AFFAIR. I TOLD HIM THAT FROM THE OUTSET OF THAT UNHAPPY FEBRUARY 14 INCIDENT, HIS GOVT HAD BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE. HIS MINISTRY HAS STILL NOT RESPONDED TO OUR LAST THREE DIP NOTES REQUESTING SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT DUBS' DEATH. I TOLD HIM THAT AN IMPORTANT REASON BEHIND CONGRESS' ACTION TO TERMINATE ECONOMIC AID WAS HIS GOVT'S PERFORMANCE IN THIS AFFAIR. SHAH WALI'S RESPONSE WAS NOT RANCOROUS. HE SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT WE STOPPED AID WAS OUR BUSINESS. HOWEVER, IF THE USG, WITH ALL ITS RESOURCES COULDN'T CLEAR UP THE MYSTERIES ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION, HOW COULD WE EXPECT THE DRA TO DO BETTER WITH RESPECT TO AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH.

12. I ALSO TOLD SHAH WALI THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WE WERE NOT PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE DRA OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED EVIDENT TO US, FROM STATEMENTS IN THE DRA GOVT-CONTROLLED RADIO AND PRESS, THAT ELEMENTS IN HIS GOVT BELIEVED WE WERE DOING SO AND CERTAINLY SOUGHT TO CONVEY THIS IMPRESSION TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. I SAID THIS HELD THE CLIMATE FOR BETTER US-AFGHAN RELATIONS. IF WE HAD EVIDENCE OF US INVOLVEMENT, I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT IT. SHAH WALI MADE NO COMMENT.

11. COMMENT. I PLAN TO USE SHAH WALI'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS A LEVER TO TRY SOLVE SOME OF OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. I SUSPECT THAT WITHIN A FEW DAYS I WILL HAVE TO CALL ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST TO TRY TO FRY LOOSE OUR MARINE GUARDS' PASSPORTS WHICH HE HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO RETURN TO US. THIS IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DRA'S DEMAND THAT WE REDUCE THE SIZE OF OUR MISSION. I WILL TELL DOST THAT IF SHAH WALI'S MSG OF DESIRING GOOD RELATIONS WAS SINCERE, I HOPE THIS CAN BE REFLECTED BY THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE PASSPORTS WITH THE REQUESTED ENTRY/EXIT VISA'S.

12. I AM NOT SURE AT THIS STAGE HOW MUCH CLOUT SHAH WALI HAS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HAFAZULLAH AMIN IS STILL VERY MUCH THE TROING MAN IN THE GOVT, AND WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT HE CONTINUES TO EXERT A LARGE POLE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I'M ALSO NOT SURE ABOUT DR. SHAH WALI'S VIEWS ABOUT THE U.S., NOTWITHSTANDING HIS EFFORT TO BE FRIENDLY TO ME. HE PROFESSED TO BE AN ADMIRER OF AMERICA, BUT I THINK HE WAS DISSEMBLING THERE. DURING THE TIME HE WAS MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACTING PLANNING MINISTER, HE WAS CONSISTENTLY OBSTRUCTIVE IN HIS DEALINGS WITH OUR USAID MISSION. GENERALLY, WE HAVE ASSESSED HIM AS BEING AMONG THE MORE HARD-LINE POLITBURO MEMBERS, AND NO FRIEND OF THE U.S. WE'LL SEE.

13. I HAVE JUST HAD A TALK WITH UK AMBASSADOR CROOK. HE MET WITH SHAH WALI SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER, AND TELLS ME THEY HAD A ROUGH SESSION (ESPECIALLY ON BBC) AND THAT THEMPEES WERE BARELY CONTROLLED. AMSTUTZ

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